MARXISM AND CONTEMPORARY EPISTEMOLOGY

By ANDRÉS BLANCO

Introduction

Richard Westra’s essay published in this Forum (2025) — a summary of his book Economics, Sciences and Capitalism (2022) — approaches an issue of crucial interest for Marxism as a theoretical tool for understanding society, even though that is not the central focus of his work: which stance should researchers committed to Marxist theory adopt regarding the epistemologies extensively developed during the 20th and 21st centuries, often grouped under the labels of  “positivism” and “neopositivism”? I believe that, contrary to the view held by several Marxists, not only is there not incompatibility between them but both can significantly enrich each other.

Objections to the incorporation of contemporary epistemology by Marxism

Why should Marxism clarify its relationships with general epistemology? In my view, the answer is simple: Marx’s intention–at least from Capital onwards–was to engage in science. Among many texts, Marx’s commitment to scientific inquiry is set out in the Preface to Capital (Marx 1976b: 101), as well as by Engels in the Preface to the English edition of that book (Marx 1976b: 111). However, the fact that Marx and Engels aspired to engage in science is merely a starting point; we must, in any case, determine whether the theoretical framework constructed by them and later Marxism is compatible with contemporary epistemology (a term I prefer over positivism and neopositivism).  

Let us begin by considering that contemporary epistemology has focused on crucial problems within science such as demarcating science from non-science, establishing methods for producing science, and defining the functions of science. Consequently, Marxism–at least as I understand it—should examine which aspects of contemporary epistemology can be further developed for its own objective: consolidating the scientific nature of social theory and distancing it from any idealistic speculation. For their part, Marx and Marxism achieved significant insights — most notably the concept of ideology and the historicity of knowledge — that integrated the heritage of epistemology as a whole.

The need to complement Marxism with mainstream epistemology is not a view universally shared by Marxists. The common objection to engaging with that epistemology stems from its disregard for history and social life as premises and context of knowledge, and its positing the neutrality of knowledge. While these shortcomings are real and manifest themselves through omission, the question should be framed differently: acknowledging the social and non-neutral nature of knowledge, why not consider the remaining contributions of mainstream epistemology? I will attempt to address this question in Section 2; but first let us examine the other objections to the intersection between Marxism and contemporary epistemology.

One strand of Marxism advocates abandoning empirical concerns on the grounds that the Marxian research project entails lifting the veil of empirical appearances to uncover underlying structures–thereby distancing completely from contemporary epistemology (e.g. Williams 1975; McCarthy 1988; Azeri 2020). However, in my view, ceasing to frame Marxism, at least in fields like economics, sociology, legal theory, political science and the like, as a scientific project and losing interest in empirical work constitutes a major error. Moreover, it represents a relapse into stale idealism that Marx and Marxism consistently combatted; believing that the world can be approached solely through rational propositions–regardless of how actual facts evolve–amounts to precisely that. Indeed, it is not difficult to trace a kinship between this “anti-empirism” and post-modernism (Eagleton 1996), a path that leads to a dead end of reducing everything to “discourse”. If reality does not exist, or does not really matter, what remains the object of analysis when discussing current events? Furthermore, the dismissal of all discourses as mere products of interests and power, ultimately rebounds upon post-modernism itself, which is a discourse as well.

A robust response to that objection is found in Bhaskar’s (1975) critical realism, often considered closely aligned with Marxian epistemology. Bhaskar maintains that–at least from the observer’s perspective–“reality” is stratified. At the first stratum lie raw empirical manifestations: this can be captured by observation but constitute, in effect, a superficial and distorted image of reality as whole. Beneath the empirical data lie events (the actual) and at a deeper level (the transfactual) lie the generative mechanisms that determine the permanent states and substantial movements of matter. In this stratification one can discern a legacy of Marx’s concept of mystification–that is, the persistent duality between appearance and essence. What is compelling about Bhaskar’s approach is his demonstration that acknowledging this duality does not necessitate abandoning empirical work. Rather, we must recognize that observation (or experimentation) explains nothing on its own. A theoretical framework must always be proposed at the transfactual level to situate observations within a constant relationship between phenomena.

Another proposal aimed at distinguishing Marxism from contemporary epistemology is advanced from the perspective of “dialectics”: it is argued that, while the latter is an essential and indispensable component of Marxism, traditional epistemology is “analytical”–meaning, it assumes that every object is, at any given moment, a single entity identical to itself (Duquette 1992; Sayers 2013). This position presupposes a specific definition of “dialectics”, one of the most intensively discussed issues within Marxism. It is my view that, although it may possess other meanings, Marxism as a research program should effectively be understood in analytical terms–which is, in fact, the approach Marx adopts in Capital (Cohen 1982).

Marx’s analysis in Capital consistently demonstrates how an economic category transforms into another (surplus value becomes capital, profit becomes interest and land rent, etc.). Crucially, this does not imply the notion that an object possesses intrinsically contradictory properties. Instead, it reflects a shift in the social relationships involved, while the objects remain unchanged. Let us take a simple example: a machine produced by a manufacturing firm is–from that firm’s perspective–a commodity composed of accumulated labor. When that machine is sold to another firm and used in its manufacturing process, it functions as capital: in the hands of the second capitalist, it enables the production of other commodities and the extraction of new surplus value. At the same time, the price paid by the second capitalist is the external form of a portion of the surplus generated by their own workers–value that transforms into capital by allowing the machine to be integrated into the production process. By the same token, a social relation is not simultaneously another social relation: for instance, the sale of labor power appears to be a relation of circulation (commodity for money), but at a deeper level (what Bhaskar would call the transfactual stratum), it is a production relation, because it is the basis for generating new commodities.

A question remains as to what should be understood as dialectics within Marxism. In “Dialectics of Nature”–at least in the paragraphs where he defines the “laws of dialectics” (1986: 211)–Engels suggests that the term generally denotes the dynamic processes inherent in matter, emphasizing that positing an object as “always identical to itself” (identity principle) is only a linguistic tool that fails to account for actual processes. Understood this way, dialectics is unassailable. The “analytical” approach would, in fact, be the static analysis of any phenomenon–one that indeed fails to capture its changing properties. However, it does not seem possible to dispense with this static approach, at least for instrumental purposes, because natural languages (and, by extension, dominant formalized languages such as mathematics) are organized in a static or “analytical” manner. In any case–and as is common in disciplines such as physics and linguistics–the crucial thing is never to lose sight of the fact that a dynamic analysis complements, rather than replaces, the static one. That is what Saussure called the interplay between the “synchronic” and the “diachronic” (1958: 81).

Claims that knowledge is generated solely by and in relation to political action–such as Ilyenkov’s pedagogy and epistemology cited by Azeri (2020)–constitute an exaggeration of Marx’s Theses on Feuerbach. While Marx condemned purely contemplative knowledge in this work, this by no means implies that he sought the abolition of theory. Indeed, a reading of Capital dispels any doubt on the matter. More importantly, completely subjugating theorization to political action represents a lapse into idealism–this time of a voluntaristic variety. If action unfailingly precedes theoretical reflection, both are left to grope in the dark. Nonetheless, this internal strain of Marxism raises a highly relevant question: is there a frontier between being and ought, which has been taken as an article of faith since Hume? I shall return to this point in the last section.

Relationships between Marxism and contemporary epistemology

We can now turn to our main question: why Marxism should bridge the gap to mainstream epistemology? I would add a pragmatic reason. The persistence of Marxism over more than a century and a half relies on its capacity to interpret social phenomena that were barely latent, invisible, or even non-existent during the lifetimes of Marx and Engels. Indeed, this explanatory richness stems from the ability of Marxist theorists to gather raw empirical material, reinterpret it, and integrate it into the Marxist “theoretical chain”.  However, this richness would significantly improve if these research strategies were linked with the foundations and methods stemming from contemporary epistemology.

Let us begin, for example, with Carnap’s (1962) statistical foundation for probability. For Carnap, science identifies regularities not in terms of rigid laws but more or less probable trends. Within this framework, accumulation of evidence in favor of an initial hypothesis increases the probability that this hypothesis represents an acceptable trend. Essentially, this is what Marx proposes, for example, regarding the equalization of the rate of profit and its tendency to fall (Marx 1991: 339).

Carnap’s proposal has a methodological implication which, whether explicitly or implicitly, guides the work of all scientists: any hypothesis must accumulate supporting evidence in order to be presented to the academic community. This characteristic is acceptable to Marxism, to the extent it accepts the challenge of subjecting its hypothesis to empirical testing (Dunne 1991). For example, in Marxian economics fieldwork has been carried out providing solid evidence for the central hypothesis of Marx and Marxism, that is the tendency of the rate of profit to fall (Karambakhsh 2026).

Turning to Popper, his well-known criterion for distinguishing science from non-science–proposing hypotheses that can be falsified or refuted–is by no means incompatible with Marx, or, once again, with Marxism, which accepts the challenge of testing its thesis with empirical evidence (Blanco 2025: 7). First, this means that theses generated within Marxist frameworks must be subjected to rigorous empirical testing to rule out the possible counterexamples or–most importantly–be abandoned if decisive counterexamples emerge. Second, Marxism can successfully challenge the hypotheses put forward by rival theories by finding strong counterexamples. In my view, the fact–which is, incidentally, indisputable–that Popper held a negative view of Marxism (see, for example, 1968: 336) is irrelevant, although a careful reading of his texts indicates that his criticism refers to Soviet dogmatism during the Stalinist period, and not to Marx or Marxism in general.

As for Kuhn, Marxism’s affinity with his conception of science as a succession of paradigms is visible. It does not differ from what Marx proposes in his Preface to “A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy” (1976a), where he states that theories are historical products, understandable in terms of evolutions of societies, and each has its categories that emerge and develop from the “general” and “abstract” to the “concrete”. One could even say that Marx anticipated Kuhn with regard to the historicity of theoretical frameworks.

Conversely, epistemology has–fortunately–drawn on ideas from Marx and Marxism about science. The notion of ideology gave rise to an entire discipline such as the sociology of knowledge, as well as critical theory, which derives, to a greater extent, from the Frankfurt School. Sociology of knowledge defines itself as such (Mannheim 1954; Luckmann & Berger 1991), both reality and knowledge are social products, such that social life determines not only what is understood as real, but also what is understood as knowledge. Perhaps this is not epistemology strictly speaking, but it is a necessary complement to the training of any scientist, even in the so-called hard sciences. It reminds us that knowledge does not arise by chance, and the way that reality is interpreted is always a product of social history.

What does have an undeniable epistemological dimension is the tradition of the Frankfurt School, the explicit heir of Marxism and its notion of ideology. Given its breadth and influence, it suffices to mention it (a good summary can be found in Celikates & Flynn (2023)), and to note that the basis of their work is the idea developed by Marx and Engels–that there is no such thing as neutral knowledge. After the Frankfurt School, it is clear that every approach to reality (particularly in the social sciences, but also in other disciplines) is permeated by biases, or determined by social interests.

Finally, the stratification of reality, which is presented as the most original feature of Bhaskar’s critical realism (1975), was undoubtedly anticipated by Marx and his notion of mystification (see above section 2).

In conclusion

The crux of the entire discussion could be summarized as follows. Marxism has two aspects that make it appealing, and will surely continue to do so in the future: its remarkable ability to account for more and more new problems, but also its emancipatory potential.

Now, then, for its theoretical strength to remain alive, we must draw on all the conceptual frameworks concerning science developed in the last century and in the present day, just like Marx did in his time with the thought that preceded him. On this point, I wish to emphasize an aspect mentioned in passing in Section 3. On one hand, it is undeniable that the mainstream of the various social disciplines is dominated by theories other than Marxism, in some cases with marked ideological traits. Economics is perhaps the most notable example, but the same can be said of sociology, political science, legal theory and so on. The situation is not merely an intellectual accident, confined to the academic world, but it is a social and political reality linked to the consolidation of capitalism and–at least in appearance–its self-representation as the sole and unquestionable form of social life. The only alternative to this is Marxism, for the reasons stated above: its emancipatory potential and explanatory power. Marxism must wage the intellectual battle on the opponents’ turf; it must be shown that even from the traditional perspective of science, Marxist explanations are superiorfor example–to the neoclassical economics of behavioral functionalism.

Moreover, if the appeal of Marxism also lies in its emancipatory potential, we are inevitably led to the problem of the relationship between theory and praxis. From this perspective, generalizing the idea Marx put forward in his Thesis on Feuerbach may offer not only a way to overcome the split between “is” and “ought”, but also a straightforward basis for action. If all knowledge is indeed driven by some kind of interest (even a biological one), then the practical implications of social theory serve as a ready starting point for political action.

 

References

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